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“Natives have always been on the move, by chance, necessity, 
barter, reciprocal sustenance, and by trade over extensive routes; 
the actual motion is a natural right, and the tribal stories of 
transmotion are a continuous sense of visionary sovereignty” 
(Gerald Vizenor, Manifest Manners ix) 
 
The concept of Native sovereignty in Vizenor's writing is both complex and simple, connected 
inseparably to his notions of “survivance” and “transmotion.” While he would seem to reject the 
territorial understanding of “tribal sovereignty” as a restrictive concept that limits the practices of 
sovereignty to designated geographical boundaries (like the reservations described as “federal 
enclaves where tribal people are contained” in Earthdivers 34), the sovereignty that 
“transmotion” encompasses is, as Michael Snyder explains, “rooted in traditional Native uses of 
land and cultural practice” (47-48). These land usages and cultural practices assume the 
fundamental right of unrestricted movement, a right which is highlighted in the Preamble to The 
Constitution of the White Earth Nation where the Anishinaabeg of the White Earth Nation are 
initially defined as “the successors of a great tradition of continental liberty.” In his commentary 
on the Constitution, David Carlson cites the list of definitions of selected terms used, published 
in Anishinaabeg Today (Wednesday, September 2, 2009), which includes the phrase “continental 
liberty”: “Continental liberty refers to the Continent of North American [sic], and native liberty 
refers to the natural freedoms and rights of natives before contact with Europeans. Natives had 
established extensive and active trade routes throughout the continent and hemisphere. Trade 
routes, and other associations of native communities required a sophisticated sense of rights, 
travel, trade, and native liberty” (19; quoted in Carlson 28).  
 The sovereignty of transmotion is, then, the right to freedom of travel but not simply the 
right of motion. Transmotion is the freedom to move across physical and conceptual boundaries; 
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between what, in Interior Landscapes, Vizenor calls “communal tribal cultures and those 
material and urban pretensions that counter conservative traditions” (162). However, in the 
absence of that freedom of physical movement, many other freedoms become impossible. This is 
where the inherent link between transmotion and survivance becomes crucial. As I have written 
elsewhere,  
in its original French meaning ... [s]urvivance signifies the qualification to inherit 
an estate and formal recognition of the legal status of a survivor. Or, in Vizenor's 
words to Jöelle Rostkowski, '[s]urvivance ... is the heritable right of succession or 
reversion of an estate, and, in the course of international declarations of human 
rights, a narrative estate of native survivance.' What this means in a Native context 
is the readiness of individuals and communities alike to continue the transmission 
of tribal cultures, values, and knowledges to future generations, through 
international and domestic legal instruments, through creative storying in literature, 
art, music, and through the practices of everyday life. (XIII) 
Transmotion, then, is the practice of transmitting tribal cultural practices across time as well as 
spaces of travel and trade. Above all, it is the freedom explored by Jodi Byrd in The Transit of 
Empire to resist “the cultural and political modes [by which] 'Indianness' [is] regulated and 
produced by U.S. settler imperialism née colonialism” (xv), a regime of production that 
generates an understanding of indigeneity, Byrd continues, “as rooted and static, located in a 
discrete place” (xvi). 
 Christopher Schedler opens his essay, “Wiindigoo Sovereignty and Native Transmotion 
in Gerald Vizenor's Bearheart,” with an incisive account of the criticisms of Vizenor's tricky 
position on the issue of tribal sovereignty—made from the perspective of American Indian 
literary nationalism by Elizabeth Cook-Lynn and Sean Kicummah Teuton—in which Schedler 
defends Vizenor's vision of “the inherent Native rights of presence, motion, and survivance on 
this continent as an 'originary' form of sovereignty, which is sustained through treaties but is not 
limited by them,” quoting Vizenor's claim that “Sovereignty as transmotion is not the same as 
notions of indigenous treaty sovereignty; transmotion can be scorned and denied, but motion is 
never granted by a government” (Schedler 35; Fugitive Poses 188). As Schedler goes on to 
explain, treaty sovereignty is constrained by the context in which it is granted: the authority of 
the US federal government. But as Vizenor insists throughout his work, indigenous sovereignty, 
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ultimately, is not a power that can be granted. The sovereignty that is indigenous “presence, 
motion, and survivance” – transmotion – inheres in Native peoples and not in the settler state. 
 This conception of Native sovereignty, as articulated by Vizenor, has always been in 
conflict with the claims to sovereignty made by settler-colonial authorities: not only the federal 
US government but, much earlier, those colonial governments and the European Crowns they 
served that initiated the symbolic economy of “Indianness” that Jodi Byrd addresses. Metacom's 
War (or “King Philip's War” 1675-1676) offers a dramatic instance of this early conflict, as well 
as the process of clearing colonial space through the settler-colonial “logic of elimination” 
defined by Patrick Wolfe as the separation, dispossession, removal, and disappearance of 
indigenous peoples from their homelands (Wolfe 387).1 Among the many grievances that 
Metacom presented to the deputy governor of Rhode Island colony, John Easton, during their 
negotiations in June 1675 were the increasing pace of land loss, the threat posed by Christian 
proselytizing, and the loss of tribal jurisdiction. These grievances represent two major dynamics 
of later US settler colonialism: territorial and cultural dispossession. However, at the outset of 
hostilities, the settler colonies employed a further strategy of Native displacement and 
sequestration, culminating in the internment of so-called “praying Indians” on Deer Island in 
Boston Harbor: the focus of this essay.2 Atrocities committed against Christian “indians” have a 
special resonance: as subjects of the English Crown, a fact acknowledged by Metacom in his 
negotiations with Easton, these “friendly” Natives should have enjoyed the protections accorded 
English subjects.3 
 The denial of such protections through the suspension of English sovereign law makes 
this internment an instance of Giorgio Agamben's “state of exception.” Agamben's exploration of 
the concept draws heavily on Carl Schmitt's Political Theology (1922), in which he theorizes 
sovereignty as arising from the assertion of authority rather than the normative power of law, 
demonstrated in the sovereign's capacity to suspend law in states of emergency. Indeed, the 
suspension of law is neither only nor most importantly an assertion of the sovereign's authority; 
in its performance, this act is constitutive of sovereignty itself. It would be inaccurate to assume 
that Metacom's grievances were complaints about rights actively taken away from passive Native 
communities by English settlers; rather, the settler assertion of the right to Christianize, the right 
to claim land, the right to legal jurisdiction, were performative assertions that produced the 
colonizing authority that settlers claimed. The power of Agamben's reworking of Schmitt's 
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fundamental idea of sovereignty, and much of its appeal to scholars of settler colonialism, lies in 
his topographical mapping of the concept into spatial or territorial terms: “Being outside yet 
belonging, this is the topological structure of the state of exception” (2005, 35). Through this 
paradoxical construction, the exception defines “the very space in which the juridico-political 
order can have validity” (1998, 19). Native space, while belonging to the territory that is to be 
colonized and yet placed outside it in juridico-political terms, is rendered exceptional by the 
assertion of sovereign settler authority to claim land, jurisdiction, and cultural control. In the 
spaces of New England “praying towns,” the rule of Judeo-Christian law produced an 
exceptional discursive and material space in which “praying Indians” both belonged to the 
category of English subjects and yet were placed outside it. As Mark Rifkin so cogently points 
out in his analysis of the frontier as a space of exception, “being within the sphere of state 
sovereignty but not covered by the normal legal principles of national law … bespeaks the 
fundamental anxiety that animates the settler-state” (2014, 176). Though he is referring to an 
historical context some hundred or more years after Metacom's War, the discursive dynamics 
that Rifkin identifies can be seen clearly at work in this earlier moment of the historical record. 
That is, the state of exception exploited by the US after 1776 had been animating the settler-state 
at least since the seventeenth century. 
 Beyond the battles, bloodshed, and unprecedented destruction in New England of 
Metacom's War, the conflict was essentially one of stories, the “authorizing” power of rhetoric, 
in what Vizenor calls “the word wars” (Wordarrows viii). Granted, the war was motivated by 
conflict over legal jurisdiction and ownership of land; the imposition of English judicial 
structures and the worldview embedded in those structures—urgent issues related to Native 
sovereignty. But these grievances were grounded in a system of conflicting symbolic meanings 
expressed in cultural narratives, most notably the nascent ideology of American exceptionalism. 
As I hope to point out, the “exceptional” state of New England Native communities—and 
specifically the so-called “praying Indians”—represents the attempt to create a state of discursive 
stasis, of rhetorical immobility: a state imposed by the English Crown, through the government 
of the settler colonies, as an act of imperial sovereignty. I want to suggest that this symbolic 
discursive condition contributed materially both to the confinement of Christianized Natives first 
in the enclaves known as “praying towns” and later the internment camps on Deer Island and 
Long Island, and also to the enduring simulation of the “indian” (The Everlasting Sky xiii-iv; 
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Manifest Manners vii; Fugitive Poses 15-14) that is located outside the historical space of 
European modernity and its conceptual space of rights discourses.4 
 In Fugitive Poses Vizenor refers to “[t]ricky stories, totemic pictures, and mental 
mappery [as] the embodiment of native transmotion and sovereignty” (170). Transmotion then is 
an expression of native ontology, located in narratives that bring together the physical land with 
an expression of Native cultural presence. This Native presence is, as Niigonwedom James 
Sinclair describes in his essay “A Sovereignty of Transmotion,” a vision of “both the physical 
and psychological realms of the universe [as] made up of interconnectivities and relationships” 
(127). Words that express transmotion, he continues, are “not only mythic vehicles and vessels 
for Anishinaabeg spirituality, philosophy, and 'traditional' teachings … but [are] historical, 
subjective, and political Anishinaabeg-centered creative, critical, and activist acts” (127). The 
right to physical spatial movement is a key aspect of indigenous sovereignty, as is the Native 
spiritual, philosophical, and subjective engagement with material space, without which 
sovereignty can be rendered precarious and vulnerable to domination by settler-colonial 
interests. A fully-realized sovereign politics addresses not only the right to land but also the right 
to express a specifically Native-centered relationship to land through physical and conceptual 
mobility. The example of the internment of converted Native communities on Deer Island (and 
elsewhere) highlights the necessary interconnection between territorial and cultural sovereignty. 
 
Exceptional “Indians” 
The events of 1675 to 1676 constitute one of the major turning-points in early settler-Native 
relations. Metacom's War was bloody, brutal, and devastating for both sides. More than a series 
of violent martial encounters, however, the war highlighted the fundamental incommensurability 
of Native and settler ontologies, focused on the issue of sovereignty. In this essay, I want to 
think about this ontological incommensurability in relation to issues of mobility and 
confinement. As Jean O'Brien notes, in Dispossession by Degrees,  
Because Indians moved their fields every few years to avoid soil exhaustion, 
landownership shifted with land use as well as the seasons. Ideas about property 
rights in hunting, fishing, and gathering related to ecological use … But principles 
of mobility existed alongside notions of fixity, as in movements between central 
village sites and, for example, the annually abundant fish spawning sites. (21)  
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These practices, related to Native mobility and fixity, were increasingly denied to the Native 
communities of New England in the period leading up to and following the war; mobility not 
only in territorial space but also in judicial, cultural, and spiritual terms was at issue for 
Metacom from the start. In June 1675, in negotiations with the deputy governor of the Rhode 
Island colony, John Easton, Metacom presented a series of grievances which included the 
increasing pace of land loss through fraudulent land sales protected by English law, the invasion 
of Native cornfields by the settlers' cattle, the threat posed by Christianization and the selling of 
alcohol, and the loss of tribal jurisdiction.5 Of course, the latter complaint—the expansion of 
English legal jurisdiction over Native communities—had been rankling since the treaties agreed 
in the aftermath of the Pequod War. The extension of colonial judicial sovereignty intensified in 
the wake of John Sassamon's death in 1674, but the assertion of settler sovereignty that 
culminated in the internment of Christianized Native communities on Deer Island went beyond 
the imposition of English law—in a manner illustrative of Schmitt's account of sovereignty as an 
artifact of authority rather than law—to assert the Crown's sovereign right to suspend the 
application of legal rights to certain subjects. As acknowledged subjects of the English Crown, 
the “praying Indians” who were removed to Deer Island should have enjoyed the protections 
extended to all English subjects. But they were not. In this respect, “praying Indians” occupied a 
discursive position that increasingly reduced the capacity to exercise the sovereignty of 
transmotion by enforcing a cumulative regime of sequestration, confinement, and 
immobilization.  
 In his account of the establishment of the “praying towns” by the missionary John Eliot, 
between 1651 and 1674, Neal Salisbury argues that the fourteen towns deliberately isolated 
Native converts from “both settlers and independent Indians” (1974, 32). Town government was 
structured on a biblical model and the court system was analogous to that of an English county 
court; while Native men played a role in town governance, all decisions were subject to approval 
by the “superintendent of subject Indians” (32), a position occupied by Daniel Gookin at the 
time of the war. The legal code enforced by the town courts, designed by Eliot, regulated a range 
of customs and behaviors in the interests of pursuing the colonial project of “civilizing” the 
Christian converts. Through territorial isolation and acculturation, Salisbury claims, “[i]n 
countless subtle ways the Indians' distance from their past was reinforced while they were as far 
as ever from being accepted as members of 'civilized' society” (34). 
Transmotion   Vol 1, No 1 (2015) 
 
 
 29 
 The settler or migrant rhetoric of American exceptionalism, which has roots in this 
colonial period, posits the United States and its founding Pilgrim Fathers as the nation uniquely 
able, and indeed charged, with the mission to bring into being a perfected world. From the 
colonial period, the understanding of New England's exceptional destiny has depended upon the 
“visible sainthood” of leaders who guide God's mission into the wilderness of the New World. 
But the assumption of sainthood for some relies upon the conviction that others are diabolical 
agents, active agents of evil, determined to destroy the divinely-sanctioned New World 
experiment. The prominent Boston minister Cotton Mather, in The Wonders of the Invisible 
World (1693), describes the land colonized by New Englanders as having originally belonged to 
Satan, who is just waiting to claim his lands back: “The New-Englanders are a People of God 
settled in those, which were once the Devils Territories; and it may easily be supposed that the 
Devil was Exceedingly disturbed, when he perceived such a people here accomplishing the 
Promise of old made unto our Blessed Jesus, That He should have the Utmost parts of the Earth 
for His Possession” (xi-xii original emphases). In these settler terms, the exceptional nature of 
colonial New England lies in the ability to win over, for Christians, territory (both literal and 
spiritual) that is Satan's. But in order to do this, those visible saints must engage in continuous 
combat with the invisible agents of Satan who will use any means to retake what they believe is 
theirs. 
 Within this symbolic context, seventeenth-century Native communities occupied an 
ambivalent position. On the one hand, Natives were seen as heathen, as barbarous, uncivilized, 
and often as the agents of Satan. On the other hand, Natives were also interpreted as tools in the 
hands of a punishing God. So sometimes their attacks on English settlements were interpreted as 
the acts of Satanic agents, working on behalf of the Devil who was trying to recapture his lost 
territory. At other times, Native people were interpreted as God's scourge, punishing the 
colonists who were failing to advance in their exceptional mission. This is how Metacom's War 
was interpreted by Daniel Gookin, a sympathetic observer: “To make a rod of the barbarous 
heathen to chastise and punish the English for their sins” (Historical Account 437). Since gentle 
chastisements had not worked to produce among colonists “effectual humiliation and 
reformation, hence the righteous and holy Lord is necessitated to draw for this smarting rod of 
the vile and brutish heathen, who indeed have been a very scourge unto New England, especially 
the Jurisdiction of Massachusetts” (437-8).  
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 Elsewhere, Gookin is more ambivalent in his inscription of Christian converts into the 
Puritan providential scheme. J. Patrick Cesarini's account of the interconnections between 
Gookin's empiricism and providentialism highlights the complexities of his thought concerning 
the exceptional position of “praying Indians.” In his Historical Account, Gookin writes the 
active presence of Native allies into the historical record of Metacom's War, in ways that caused 
the book to be refused publication in 1677. As Cesarini points out, he presents the hostility of 
settlers as the justification for Native mistrust and, in some cases, defection to unconverted 
communities (492). Indeed, Gookin claims that the “praying towns” were at one point during the 
war offered as a kind of human shield or “wall of defence [sic] about the greatest part of the 
colony of Massachusetts”  both as evidence of the fidelity and loyalty of the inhabitants and their 
desire to “take off the animosity and displeasure that they perceived was enkindled in some 
English against them” (Historical Account, 436). He then takes the opportunity to observe that 
the English could have avoided much of the suffering of the war if only they had embraced 
converted Natives as their full allies. At its most radical, Gookin's writing portrays the “praying 
Indians” as victims of what Cesarini calls “a Puritan colony unable to control itself – either 
politically or spiritually” (500). This view leads Gookin then to propose a dramatic reversal of 
the providential role played by Puritans and “praying Indians” respectively: in order to test the 
authenticity of their conversion, God has transformed the settler community into a scourge of 
indigenous converts. This is a radical subversion of the providential scheme in which, as 
Cesarini explains, “the Indians were considered the objects, the special instruments, of God's 
agency, but the English alone were God's subjects. God spoke through the Indians, but he never 
spoke to them” (497 original emphases). The perception that the settlers may be in need of 
reminders of God's disfavor was not, as Cesarini notes, confined to Gookin; contemporaries like 
Increase Mather saw Metacom's War as a providential sign of the colonists' sinful backsliding 
and so called for a general renewal of the covenant that joins all members of all New England 
churches with each other and with God.  
 Gookin claims that his “primary appeal on behalf of the converts was to remind colonial 
authorities that they were bound by their covenants to deal justly with them” (Cesarini 506). 
Here then is a further “exceptionalization” of Christian Natives: they were English subjects but 
denied the protections of that status; they were members of the Puritan covenant but they were 
denied the rights of membership.6 Even such a sympathetic commentator as Daniel Gookin 
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admits as much, in a striking use of typological rhetoric to express his providentialism. 
Describing one of the “praying towns”—Okommakamesit—he writes: “This town doth join so 
near to the English of Marlborough, that it was spoken of David in type, and our Lord Jesus 
Christ, the antitype, Under his shadow ye shall rejoice: but the Indians here do not much rejoice 
in the English men's shadow; who do so overtop them in their number of people, stocks of cattle, 
&c. that the Indians do not greatly flourish, or delight in their station at present” (Historical 
Collections 45).7 By failing to answer the biblical promise (“spoken … in type”) of flourishing 
in the shadow of the “godly,” the “Indians” fail to answer (in the antitype) the exceptionalist 
promise of the New England mission. The symbolic promise symbolized by David and fulfilled 
by the coming of the Messiah has not been fulfilled by the promise of the converts' delivery into 
a new dispensation. They are excluded from the divine destiny of the New England colonies by 
biblical authority, which Gookin interestingly spatializes. Thus, even converted “Indians” can 
never become sufficiently converted to participate fully in the exceptionalist colonial mission 
and so can never possess the full rights that attach to a Puritan subject of the English Crown.  
 There is no doubt that converted Natives submitted formally to the sovereignty of the 
colonial government and hence to the Crown. Neal Salisbury traces the events that led the 
Massachusett sachem Cutshamekin to submit formally to the Massachusetts Bay government in 
1644, in a move designed to protect his standing among his people but that instead opened his 
community to the influence of missionaries, which soon challenged his authority. Salisbury 
remarks, “The Massachusett thereby became the first Indians in New England to enter a new 
legal status, one in which they were neither independent nor assimilated into white society” 
(1974, 36). Four years later, the Massachusetts General Court, at the session held on 4 
November, announced that two ministers would be sent each year to preach in Native 
communities because of the fact that “divers of them [Indians] are become subjects to the 
English, and have engaged themselves to be willing and ready to understand the law of God” 
(Shurtleff, 178). Daniel Gookin, in his Historical Collections of the Indians in New England, 
explains that “The reason, why the English government is concerned with the Indians' affairs in 
point of rule and order, is because all those praying Indians in Massachusetts colony did long 
since, before they began to worship God, actually and solemnly submit themselves unto the 
jurisdiction and government of the English in the Massachusetts, as the records do declare” (39). 
And in his “Notes on the Nipmuc Indian Reservation at Hassanamesit,” quoting from the 
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Massachusetts Bay Records (MBR, 30:146),  Thomas Lewis Doughton highlights the moment in 
May 1668 when Nipmuc sagamores formally “submitted” to English colonial authority, which is 
worth quoting at length: 
The humble submission and subjection of the Native Indians sagamores and people 
of the Nipmucks inhabiting within the bounds of the patttens [sic] of Massachusetts 
and near adjoining unto the English towns so-called of Mendon and Marlboroug[h] 
 
We the inhabitants of Mongunkachogok Chaubunkongkomuk Asukodnogest 
Kesapusgus Wabuhquoshish and the adjacent parts of Nipmuk being convinced of 
our great sinns & how good it is to turn unto the Lord and be his servants by praying 
or calling upon his name ... do give up ourselves to God ... we finding by experience 
how good it is to live under laws & good government and how much we need the 
protection of the English. We doe freely out of our own motion and voluntary choyce 
do submit our selves to the government of Massachusetts (n.p.). 
Despite this symbolic and material “subjection” to the Crown, in the course of the war, “praying 
Indians” were denied their fundamental rights as English subjects. The order for their removal 
was passed by the General Court in Boston in October 1675; survivors were permitted to return 
to the mainland in May 1676. The notion that an entire community can be deemed a security risk 
is a recurrent theme in American history, but this settler logic reaches back into the colonial 
heritage, and produces the enduring image of the threatening unassimilated “Indian.” That the 
people could be removed to Deer Island so efficiently was the consequence of their earlier 
confinement to so-called “praying towns” – notably Natick, from which everyone was removed 
to Deer Island. 
 In the 1647 tract, “Day Breaking if not the Sun Rising of the Gospel with the Indians of 
New England,” John Eliot describes the missionary effort to persuade the Massachusetts General 
Court to establish a separate town for converted Natives (9, 27). The request came from Native 
leaders and, as scholars such as Jean O'Brien have noted, represented one strategy by which 
Native communities attempted to retain some formal title to what land they could claim, as well 
as allowing Native participation in political and legal matters. However, as she goes on to 
explain in relation to Natick specifically:  
The commonwealth elaborated a special judicial mechanism for Indians when 
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Daniel Gookin was appointed as superintendent of Indians in 1656. The system 
Gookin implemented followed the precedents of the submission agreements and 
Praying Town codes, while creating a structure of Indian magistrates operating 
under the ultimate supervision of the English. There was to be no mistaking who 
gained ultimate power. (Dispossession by Degrees, 50)   
And, in the course of the war, towns such as this became effective prisons for converted Native 
people. Interestingly, in his account of the establishment of the “praying towns”, Daniel Gookin 
cites two reasons why objections to the grant of land are invalid. The first and foremost is 
“forasmuch as it was all their native country and propriety, before the English came into 
America; the answer is ready: First, that the English claim right to their land, by patent from our 
king” (Historical Collections 39). Gookin implicitly draws on the doctrine of vacuum 
domicilium but explicitly links the right to land with the sovereignty of the English Crown. 
There is a contradiction here: if land is rightfully granted to his subjects through the sovereign 
power of the English King then, as English subjects, Christian Natives should not need to justify 
their claim to the land. And yet they do. It is here that Gookin captures the paradox of 
indigenous exceptionalism, the consequences of which are formulated so clearly by Mark 
Rifkin:  
The knowledge of the prior presence and continuing existence of Indigenous 
peoples in now-'domestic' space ... enters settler law as the difficulty of legitimizing 
the state's jurisdiction over Native peoples. The attendant series of logical and 
normative confusions, contradictions, and crises generated by this problem leads to 
the legal and administrative construction of a state of exception for Native Peoples. 
(177) 
 
Movement, Stasis, and the State of Exception 
The internment of the inhabitants of the fourteen “praying towns” was not a sudden move on the 
part of the colonial authorities but a process: the culmination of the erosion of the sovereign 
Native freedom of movement that intensified during the period of the war. Starting in 1675, in a 
process of ever-increasing confinement and immobilization, these Native people were first 
prohibited from leaving their villages, and then were removed from their homes to Deer Island 
in Boston Harbor, where many perished of hunger, disease, and exposure. In June 1675 all the 
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“praying Indians” in New England were relocated to five towns; in October 1675 the General 
Court removed the people to two camps: one on Long Island, the other a larger camp on Deer 
Island—including, as I remarked earlier, the entire population of Natick (Clark 22). On 5 May 
1676, the General Court ordered the removal of the Native people confined at the Long Island 
camp to English garrisons, where they were to stay on pain of death (Shurtleff 86). Granted, the 
detention of the “praying Indians” took place in the context of the most vicious conflict ever 
fought on American soil. In the fourteen months between June 1675 and August 1676 more than 
half the settler towns were destroyed, according to Jill Lepore's account, pushing English 
settlement back to the coast, and coming within only a few miles of Boston.8 Thousands of 
Native people died, many of starvation or disease, and later many were sold into slavery in the 
West Indies.  
 The session held on 9 July 1675, where Gookin was present, voted to repeal the law 
allowing licensed persons to sell to “any Indian or Indians, not in hostility wth us, pouder, shott, 
lead, guns, hand gunnes, rapier blades, swords, &c” (Shurtleff, 45). In the August 1675 session 
the Massachusetts Council ordered all converted Natives to be confined to “praying towns” and, 
according to Gookin's report of the Court records, a series of further constraints on Native 
mobility was imposed: hunting in the woods was prohibited, as was entertaining “any strange 
Indians,” and a limit was set of one mile from their “dwellings” unless accompanied by English 
persons (Historical Account 450). This issue of Native “dwellings” is supplemented by the 
Court's assertion that “The places of the Indians’ residence are, Natick, Punquapog, Nashobah, 
Wamesit and Hassanamesit. And if there be any that belong to other places, they are to repair to 
some one of these” (Historical Account 451). This proclamation defines “Indianness” according 
to the occupation of space, constraining indigenous identity to specific spaces and enforcing 
through the threat of death the identification of place with “Indianness.” For a Native person to 
be “out of place” would be to become a “not-Indian” or a “strange Indian” who can be killed 
with impunity because such a person has no ontology within this exceptional scheme, once they 
are located outside the circumscribed paradoxical space of “the Christian Indian.” 
 The provision for enforcing these orders was death, for which Native people found 
outside their designated place would be to blame. In this way, the exercise of the sovereignty of 
transmotion – which so clearly subverts the immobility of the state of exception – was 
effectively deemed a capital offence. Native people could move between towns only with the 
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express authorization of the General Court and the confinement of Christian Natives was further 
intensified during the following legislative session, on 13 October 1675, when the Massachusetts 
Council ordered that Christian Indians be forcibly removed to Deer Island. This is the opening 
article of the session: “WHEREAS not wthstanding the councils former prohibition of all Indians 
coming to, or remayning in, the toune of Boston, wee finde that still there remajnes ground of 
feare that, vnless more effectuall care be taken, wee may be exposed to mischiefe by some of 
that barbarous crew, or any strangers, not of our nation, by the coming into or residing in the 
toune of Boston, this Court doeth therefore order”… and eight separate orders follow (Shurtleff 
47). Firstly, that no one will “entertain or countenance” any “Indian” under penalty of treason; 
secondly, guards will prevent the entry of any “Indian” into Boston and armed guards will 
accompany any “Indian” allowed access and those who are “employed upon any message or 
business” of the Council will be taken directly to the Governor and by him be “disposed of & 
secured during their necessary stay for the dispatch of their business,” while no other “Indian” 
will permitted to stay in the town “unless in prison”; thirdly, any unguarded “Indian” could be 
lawfully “secured” by any person; fourthly, that the military are instructed to be alert for the 
approach of canoes; fifthly, that the Charles Town ferry is prohibited from allowing any 
“Indian” to disembark unless accompanied by an armed guard; sixthly, that any person may 
lawfully “apprehend and secure” any “Indian” approaching the town; seventhly, and I want to 
quote this order in full:  
That account be taken of all straingers who are not his majestjes subjects, and that 
they remajne not in toune vnless security be given for their fidelity, and that none be 
admitted but vpon the like security, and that no master of any vessell bring in any 
wthout acquainting the Gouernor therewith, & presenting their persons in order to 
their examination, who, if vpon their examination can give no good account of their 
business, and security for their good behaviour, shall be sent to prison vnless they 
doe forth with depart (Shurtleff 47). 
The final order in this list of constraints on Native mobility specified that no inhabitant of 
Boston could lawfully entertain “any stranger” in their house, under pain of any penalty the 
Court might see fit to impose (Shurtleff, 46-7). I have quoted the seventh order in full because, 
again, it formally if implicitly, excludes converted Natives from the category of “his Majesty's 
subjects.” In the state of exception, subject Native people were rendered immobile by these 
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orders and those that specified the condition of capital punishment under which detainees were 
interned. The Court Record states: 
Whereas this Court haue, for weighty reasons, placed sundry Indians (that haue 
subjected to our goumt) vpon some islands for their and our security,-- 
  It is ordered, that none of the sajd Indians shall presume to goe off the sajd 
islands voluntarily, vpon pajne of death; and it shallbe [sic] laufull for the English to 
destroy those that they shall finde stragling off from the sajd places of theire 
confinement, vnlesse taken of by order from authorjty, and vnder an English guard. 
And it is further ordered, that if any person or persons shall presume to take, steale, 
or carry away either man, woeman, or child of the sajd Indians, off from any the sajd 
islands where they are placed, wthout order from the Generall Court or council, he or 
they shall be accounted breakers of the capitall law printed & published against man 
stealing; and this order to be forthuith posted and published. 
  The whole Court being mett, it is ordered, that the country Tresurer take 
care for ye provission of those Indians that are sent doune to Deare Island, so as to 
pvent their perishing by any extremity that they may be put vnto for want of absolute 
necessaries, and for that end he is to appoint meet persons to vissit [sic] them from 
time to time (Shurtleff 64). 
 The effects of this confinement are described by Gookin as follows: “By this order … the 
poor Christian Indians were reduced to great sufferings, being hindered from their hunting and 
looking after their cattle, swine, and getting in their corn, or laboring among the English to get 
clothes, and many other ways incommoded also, were daily exposed to be slain or imprisoned, if 
at any time they were found without their limits” (Historical Account 451). And even while 
acknowledging the severe sufferings and the brutal conditions of Deer Island, the Court enforced 
the detention of Christian Natives with the threat of summary execution. At the end of December 
1675, Gookin accompanied John Eliot on a visit to the Island. In his account of this visit he 
reflects that   
I observed in all my visits to them, that they carried themselves patiently, humbly, 
and piously, without murmuring or complaining against the English for their 
sufferings, (which were not few), for they lived chiefly upon clams and shell-fish, 
that they digged out of the sand, at low water; the Island was bleak and cold, their 
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wigwams poor and mean, their clothes few and thin; some little corn they had of 
their own, which the Council ordered to be fetched from their plantations, and 
conveyed to them by little and little; also a boat and man was appointed to look 
after them. (Historical Account 485-86)   
 
The Paradoxical Rhetoric of the Exception 
The tone of Gookin's account is apologetic; he explains parenthetically that the Council was 
obliged to take these measures “to quiet the people” (451) but rhetorically he is caught between 
a sympathetic view of the Native right to freedom of movement—the sovereignty of 
transmotion—and the impact of settler violence against all indigenous people, including 
“praying Indians.” Indeed, he attempts to navigate the complex position of Native communities 
that are acknowledged as sovereign nations, on the one hand, and domestic combatants, on the 
other. He cites the opinion of the Council that restrictions on Native mobility are necessary 
because the hostile tribes act “contrary to the practice of civil nations” (450). Trapped physically 
and rhetorically between the status of “civil nations” and hostile subject peoples, Gookin's 
communities of “praying Indians” were exceptionally marked for forced removal, 
immobilization, and summary execution should they exercise the right to transmotion. Rendered 
“strangers” in their traditional lands, but at the same time subjects of the Crown before the 
representatives of which they rhetorically prostrate themselves, “praying Indians” were placed in 
the exceptional rhetorical position of being “out of place” wherever they were placed. Being 
“out of place” for any Native person, who could not justify being in the place where (s)he was 
apprehended, was treated severely. For example, in the same session of the Court, “Two Indians, 
one an old man named Mannapaugh, & Mannanesit, a young man, his sonn, pretending 
themselues to belong to Vncas, being found at Chelmsford, where the haystacke was fired, 
giving no reason of their coming & staying here, was judged to be spyes, and ordered to be sent 
away by the Treasurer” (Shurtleff 58). This phrase, “to be sent away by the Treasurer,” was a 
euphemism for being sold out of the colony to the West Indies as a slave. And here we have 
perhaps the most scandalous exemption from the protections of law suffered by the Native 
peoples of New England during this conflict—the selling into slavery of loyal “Indians,” who 
had no real part in the conflict. As Jill Lepore explains, a dramatic case was that of Metacom's 
son. When Metacom's wife and 9-year-old son were apprehended, they were imprisoned in 
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Boston while the Court debated the child's fate. Contradictory scriptural passages were invoked 
to determine whether or not the child should be executed: on the one hand, the injunction that 
the crimes of the father should not be visited upon the child and, on the other hand, biblical 
examples where children grow up to be the scourge of future generations. After eight months 
delay, the boy was sent into exile – sold and shipped to Barbados or Jamaica. As Lepore notes, 
the legality of enslaving this child was debated but the legality of enslaving Native subjects of 
the English Crown, interpreting them instead as sovereign enemy combatants, was not debated. 
Indeed, as she observes: “This ambiguity, over whether Indian peoples are sovereign or 
subjected, would lie at the heart of Indian-white relations in the colonies and later the union, 
until the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia in 1831, in which John 
Marshall would assign Indians the unique status of 'domestic dependent nations'” (164).  
 This contradictory and ambivalent condition – the subjected sovereign subject – 
represents Agamben's state of exception as the situation in which the rule of law is exceptionally 
suspended in an act that validates in its very exercise the sovereignty of the power that suspends 
the law. In this case, the General Court of Massachusetts, threatened in its very existence by 
Metacom's resistance, asserted its sovereignty over communities of converted Natives by first 
accepting their formal subjection to English rule and then exempting those Native subjects from 
the protections of English law. The denial of such protections through the suspension of English 
sovereign law makes this internment an illustrative instance of Agamben's state of exception. 
According to Agamben, exemption from the law through the intervention of a sovereign power 
confirms that power's sovereignty and transcendence of law by the act of creating the exception. 
Though this exception is enacted as being itself exceptional, Agamben points out that in fact 
such exceptions prove the rule of sovereign power: “The paradox of sovereignty consists in the 
fact the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order. … The sovereign, 
having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law” 
(Homo Sacer 15).9 For example, Gookin recorded Joseph Tuckapawill's remarks when he and 
his family were offered hospitality by English friends of John Eliot before they were sent to 
Deer Island: 
… I am greatly distressed this day on every side; the English have taken away some 
of my estate, my corn, cattle, my plough, cart, chain, and other goods [Tuckapawill 
explained]. The enemy Indians have also taken a part of what I had; and the wicked 
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Indians mock and scoff at me, saying ‘Now what is become of your praying to God?’ 
The English also censure me, and say I am a hypocrite. In this distress I have no 
where to look, but up to God in heaven to help me; now my dear wife and eldest son 
are (through English threatening) run away, and I fear will perish in the woods for 
want of food; also my aged mother is lost; and all this doth greatly aggravate my 
grief. But yet I desire to look up to God in Christ Jesus, in whom alone is my help ... 
I never did join with them against the English. Indeed, they solicited me, but I utterly 
denied and refused it. I thought within myself, it is better to die than to fight against 
the church of Christ. (qtd. Doughton, n.p.) 
Here we see the space of the exception at its most brutal. Immobilized juridically so he has no 
recourse to either English or Native justice (both steal from him with impunity), caught 
discursively between the categories of Native and English, and confronting the prospect of 
internment at the hands of his fellow English subjects and covenant members, John Tuckapawill 
is left with only the thought of death. He has no other place to go.  
 The losses experienced by exceptional “praying Indians” like Tuckapawill are suggested 
by Michael Clark who, in his introduction to the Eliot Tracts, describes the profound changes 
undergone by converted Native people:  
the shift to permanent residence versus a seminomadic [sic] lifestyle, the need for 
European farming techniques to make the permanently cultivated fields productive, 
corollary changes in gender roles and generational expectations regarding children 
and the elderly, and new British names, clothes, and hairstyles, ... name only the 
most obvious examples of how life changed for the Indians who moved into the 
Praying Towns. (18)  
To these factors Neal Salisbury adds those that were the indirect consequence of environmental 
changes. For example, the scarcity of bear's grease prevented its use on skin and hair, while furs 
required for clothing and the construction of wigwams were inaccessible (1974, 34). Harold W. 
Van Lonkhuyzen, in his “Reappraisal of the Praying Indians,” makes the same point about 
changing material lifeways but takes this further to observe the ways in which these changes are 
related to profound shifts in tribal ontology: so the increasing reliance on domesticated animals 
produced an alteration in relations with animals and animal spirit masters (412), the building of 
fences changed attitudes towards property, land, and the earth; the influence of heteropatriarchy 
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disrupted gender and social roles; and education, especially reading, “altered the converted 
Indians' cognitive appreciation of the world” (413). These transformations, for Christian Natives 
like Tuckapawill, were the consequences of their choice to live within the territorial jurisdiction 
of New England and to accept the sovereignty of the English Crown. And yet they were 
imprisoned in murderous conditions because they remained “Indians” despite their religious 
conversion and cultural assimilation. Why? Salisbury shows convincingly that while the 
“praying towns” may have seemed to be in transition to a state of full assimilation into English 
culture, the greatest opposition to the towns came from those settlers in closest proximity to 
them, revealing that full integration was never, in fact, on the colonial agenda (1974, 41-42).  
 The experience of the “praying Indians” exposes the fact that race, and white supremacy 
specifically, underpins the settler-colonial state of exception.10 The General Court Record 
reports multiple cases where the “wrong kind of Indian” was inadvertently sold into slavery – 
because all Native people looked alike to English eyes. Those who could not be sold were 
indistinguishable from those who could; the enemy was indistinguishable from the ally. As the 
Court reflected, “It being difficult to Discern between Friends & Foes ... This Court doth order 
and appoint that ... such [Indians] as are not [abroad] are forthwith to return to their respective 
stations, as also such as are Sojourning within any of our Towns excepting only those who are 
constant dwellers in English Houses” (quoted O'Brien, Dispossession by Degrees 70; Mass 
Archive, 30: 315, 1689/90). The only way to protect friendly Natives was to imprison them. The 
bodily markers of difference operated only to distinguish “White” from “Red,” not to signify 
degrees of political and cultural allegiance. Gookin, in his Historical Account, is only one of 
many proponents of the view that internment on Deer Island was a good thing for converted 
Native people because confinement offered protection from violently hostile settlers (485). Jean 
O'Brien explains that the term “Friend Indians,” to signify allies, was agreed between the 
English and the Mohawks who had been raiding “praying Indians” since the 1660s. She 
describes how “[t]heir negotiations centered on the problem of how to tell the difference 
between the two” (Dispossession by Degrees 65). Mohawks, thinking militarily, would ask: 
“Why would 'Friend Indians' require 'stockadoes' for protection? 'Friend Indians' resided 'in ye 
woods,' not barricaded within a fortress in the shadow of English settlements” (65); in contrast, 
English thinking was in terms of allies and the Council specified four towns where “friends” 
lived: Natick, Punkapoag, Hassanamisco, and Wamesit. O'Brien notes that “These Indian 
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settlements carried English implications about boundaries, and the sedentary organization of 
town activities,” unlike the Mohawk who had different ideas about where friends and allies 
would be located (Dispossession by Degrees 66). 
 In discursive terms, the category of the “indian,” to which enemies and allies of the 
English alike were subject, reduced all Native people to the cultural binaries of civilization 
versus savagery. In these terms, all “Indians” were “savages” and of necessity excluded from the 
exceptional destiny of English America. Placed under erasure as Native yet un-erasable as 
Christians, the rhetorical or categorical immobility of the exception to which Christian Natives 
were subject can be seen as the symbolic counterpoint to their material confinement – in praying 
towns, in English garrisons, on Deer Island and Long Island – and in the continuing restrictions 
on indigenous mobility, on Native transmotion, imposed in the aftermath of Metacom's War. 
 
Conclusion: Transmotion, Survivance, and the Lessons of Deer Island 
Harold Van Lonkhuyzen highlights the profound consequences of immobilization or what he 
calls the increasing “sedentarism” (412) of the New England tribes during this period, a 
tendency that was accelerated under the influence of missionaries like John Eliot: “sedentarism 
impeded mobility and disrupted traditional subsistence cycles of food gathering and production” 
(412). In addition to changing usages of the land through the abandonment of indigenous forms 
of agriculture—and the changing material lifeways to which this gave rise—converted Natives 
experienced changes in their ontological orientation to the world. Among the examples that Van 
Lonkhuyzen offers is fences, the impact of which he traces directly to missionary influence: 
“The fences Eliot encouraged the Natick men to build simply could not be integrated into the 
Indians' traditional ethos but instead required and simultaneously reinforced a new one. Many 
other bands never made the significant change in behavior and cognitive understanding such 
enclosures necessitated. Fences went unbuilt; those that were, were not maintained” (413). We 
might recall here Stone Columbus' proclamation: “The notion of sovereignty is not tied to the 
earth, sovereignty is neither fence nor feathers” (Heirs of Columbus 67). The new tribal nation 
imagined at Point Assinika is aligned with a vision of borderless sovereignty that exceeds but 
does not deny territorial sovereignty: Stone Columbus continues, “The essence of sovereignty is 
imaginative, an original tribal trope, communal and spiritual, an idea that is more than metes and 
bounds in treaties” (67). Immobilization in place, secured by the discourse of exceptionalism, 
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works to oppose the sovereignty of transmotion. Many scholars have addressed the ironic 
outcomes of the acculturative efforts of Native people in this period; the effort to adapt English 
social, judicial, and cultural structures to traditional tribal practices in the interests of 
maintaining claims to land, but which resulted in losses in terms of land and cultural practices, 
and sovereignty over both. In the aftermath of the war, those survivors who escaped enslavement 
were sequestrated in the four remaining “praying towns” that Salisbury describes as “no longer 
havens for those making conscious commitments to Christianity; they were reservations for an 
entire Native population” (1974, 54).  
 Reserved and exceptional, the indigenous inhabitants of towns like Natick found, in the 
decades following the war, that the material necessities of traditional tribal life became 
increasingly scarce (such as deer and timber); in the 1680s the first white settlers arrived on the 
Natick reserve; and Van Lonkhuyzen ventures to guess that the practice of communal habitation 
was abandoned around 1700 (424). Over the following fifty years or so, whites came to occupy 
all the offices of town government, Native languages fell into disuse, and rights to common land 
were vested in family inheritance rather than communal membership (Van Lonkhuyzen 423-
427). In the state of exception, converted Natives were immobilized discursively and territorially 
in place; while bounded and fenced this space was not quarantined from the material impacts of 
the wider settler-colonial environment. Consequently, the capacity of these Native communities 
to create the conditions for an inheritable estate, a fundamental aspect of survivance, were 
compromised (though not destroyed) along with the denial of imaginative freedoms that 
constitute the sovereignty of transmotion. 
 The legacy of this history then is twofold: insight into the discursive workings of settler 
colonialism and the possibilities for indigenous resistance highlighted by Vizenor's concept of 
“transmotion”: “that sense of native motion and ... active presence, [which] is sui generis 
sovereignty” (Fugitive Poses 15). The liminal discursive position of “exceptional” Native people 
during Metacom's War was materialized or symbolized by, but also enabled, their detention on 
Deer Island and elsewhere. The very denial of indigenous mobility highlights its crucial 
importance in the structure of settler colonialism. As Niigonwedom Sinclair notes in the essay 
cited at the beginning of this essay, transmotion in Vizenor's Anishinaabe conception “is the 
practical combination of perception and expression, thought and action, imagination and motion. 
… Transmotion is not about giving up tribal identities, knowledges, and beliefs when you leave 
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the imaginative world, but bringing them into being. … It is this movement between imaginative 
and 'real' worlds that brings sovereignty into being” (145). It is perhaps to historical events such 
as Metacom's War that Vizenor responds in his emphasis on the symbolic importance of 
mobility as a fundamental aspect of Native sovereignty, an emphasis that characterizes the 
imaginative and discursive sovereignty asserted by The Constitution of the White Earth Nation. 
An emphasis on issues of territorial treaty sovereignty risks the stasis of the exceptional, liminal 
figure of the “indian”—as the fate of the Deer Island “Indians” shows. In contrast, transmotion, 
an indigenous understanding of mobility that brings together discursive and territorial practices 
of sovereignty makes possible a Native-specific, “sui generis” sovereignty. 
 
Notes 
1. Patrick Wolfe describes settler colonialism as a structure that works in two dimensions: 
“Negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial 
society on the expropriated land base” (388). Here, I focus on the negative dimension of settler 
colonialism as it works to erase not only physical but also conceptual traces of prior Native 
presence. 
2. I am suggesting that the internment of Native communities on Deer Island in 1675-76 is an 
early colonial instance of what became the federally imposed Native “enclaves” that Vizenor 
references, for example, in Wordarrows as reservations (82), and in Chair of Tears where the 
museum enclaves (115) that exhibit Native subjects contrast with actual Natives who are, 
significantly, “museums in motion” (116, emphasis added), and in Earthdivers where he 
describes how “[t]he curse of racism rules the ruinous institutions and federal enclaves where 
tribal people are contained” (34). 
3. In view of Vizenor's comprehensive critique of the term “Indian,” throughout I have used the 
term “praying Indians” where it is used in the documentary record but the terms “converted 
Natives” and “Christian Natives” in my own usage. 
4. On the erasure of Native people from the discourse of modernity in general and the colonial 
New England discourse of nation-building in particular, see Jean O'Brien, Firsting and Lasting: 
Writing Indians out of Existence in New England (2010). 
5.  See John Easton, “A Relation of the Indian War” (1675) in A Narrative of the Causes which 
led to Philip's Indian War of 1675 and 1676, ed. Franklin B. Hough, 1-31. See also Neal 
Salisbury's introduction to his edition of Mary Rowlandson's The Sovereignty and Goodness of 
God, and Yasuhide Kawashima's compelling account of the aggressive extension of legal 
jurisdiction by Plymouth Colony, which shifted discursive relations between settlers and 
indigenous peoples in the direction of war, in Igniting King Philip's War (2001). 
6. On the central discursive importance of the federal covenant to proto-national identity, see 
Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (1975). 
7. In reference to settler opposition to the establishment of praying towns, Salisbury observes: 
“The most intransigent opposition came from the residents of Marlborough, whose conflict with 
the praying town of Okommakamesit, immediately adjoining, persisted into King Philip's War” 
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(1974, 40). 
8. Edward Randolph was sent to New England as an emissary of King James II to report on the 
extent of the losses occasioned by the conflict. In 1685 he reported: “No advantage but many 
disadvantages have arisen to the English by the warre, for about 600 men have been slaine, and 
12 captains, most of them brave and stout persons and of loyal principles, whilest the church 
members had liberty to stay at home and not hazard their persons in the wildernesse. 
 The losse to the English in the severall colonies, in their habitations and stock, is 
reckoned to amount to [£]150,000/ there having been about 1200 houses burned, 8000 head of 
cattle, great and small, killed, and many thousand bushels of wheat, pease and other grain burned 
(of which the Massachusets colony hath not been damnifyed one third part, the great losse 
falling upon New Plymouth and Connecticot colonies) and upward of 3000 Indians men women 
and children destroyed, who if well managed would have been very serviceable to the English, 
which makes all manner of labour dear” (460). Benjamin Trumbull, in his History of 
Connecticut (1818; I. 351) notes that “All the buildings in Narraganset, from Providence to 
Stonington, a tract of about 50 miles, were burned, or otherwise destroyed” (editorial note; 
Gookin, Historical Account, 437n). 
9. See Mark Rifkin's essay in which he offers a revision of Agamben's concept of the state of 
exception from three perspectives: “the persistent inside/outside tropology he uses to address the 
exception, specifically the ways it serves as a metaphor divorced from territoriality; the notion of 
‘bare life’ as the basis of the exception, especially the individualizing ways that he uses that 
concept; and the implicit depiction of sovereignty as a self-confident exercise of authority free 
from anxiety over the legitimacy of state actions” (90). 
10. We might recall here Samson Occom's similar recognition at the end of his Short Narrative 
of my Life (1768) that although he exercised imaginative transmotion, moving between Mohegan 
and English cultural worlds, still he was confronted with the daily racism of white supremacy. 
Occom concludes, “I must Say, I believe it is because I am a poor Indian. I can't help that God 
has made me So; I did not make myself So.–” (Collected Writings, 58). 
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